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SE C U R I T Y I N WIRELESS
MO B I L E AD HOC A N D SENSOR NETWORKS
INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network
formed by a large number of sensor nodes, each
equipped with sensor(s) to detect physical phe-
nomena such as heat, light, motion, or sound.
Using different sensors, WSNs can be imple-
mented to support many applications including
security, entertainment, automation, industrial
monitoring, public utilities, and asset manage-
ment. However, many WSN devices have severe
resource constraints in terms of energy, compu-
tation, and memory, caused by a need to limit
the cost of the large number of devices required
for many applications and by deployment scenar-
ios that prevent easy access to the devices. Such
resource limitations lead to many open issues —
including WSN security — which have been
studied actively by researchers. Many applica-
tions require WSNs to exchange sensitive infor-
mation or contain feedback processes that have
high reliability requirements, and they require a
high level of security to succeed. Yet, strong
security is difficult to achieve with resource-lim-
ited sensor nodes, and many well-known
approaches become infeasible. In this article, we
explore the security issues for key management
for WSNs. First, we examine the needs and
requirements for key management. Then, we
explore several promising key management pro-
tocols, and conclude with a discussion of future
trends that may affect their development.
KEY MANAGEMENT
Before a WSN can exchange data securely,
encryption keys must be established among sen-
sor nodes. Key distribution refers to the distribu-
tion of multiple keys among the sensor nodes,
which is typical in a non-trivial security scheme.
Key management is a broader term for key dis-
tribution, which also includes the processes of
key setup, the initial distribution of keys, and
key revocation — the removal of a compromised
key.
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ABSTRACT
Key management has remained a challenging
issue in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) due to
the constraints of sensor node resources. Vari-
ous key management schemes that trade off
security and operational requirements have been
proposed in recent years. In this article, we first
examine the security and operational require-
ments of WSNs and then review five key man-
agement protocols: Eschenauer, Du, LEAP,
SHELL, and Panja. Eschenauer’s scheme is a
classical random key distribution scheme for
WSNs. Du’s scheme improves on Eschenauer’s
scheme by using key matrices. LEAP provides a
highly flexible key management scheme using
four types of keys. SHELL focuses on achieving
high robustness, and Panja is optimized for hier-
archical WSNs. LEAP, SHELL, and Panja sup-
port cluster-based operations and are more
aligned with current trends as shown by the new
standards, IEEE 802.15.4b and the ZigBee
“enhanced” standard. Future developments like-
ly will incorporate the features of LEAP and
adjustable robustness enhancements from
Eschenauer or Du; extremely security-critical
applications may benefit from restructuring
SHELL to ease implementation and mainte-
nance. Developments for extremely large WSNs
should consider improving Panja’s scheme due
to its hierarchical scalability feature.
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THE NEED FOR KEY MANAGEMENT
Key management, like security, is a cross-lay-
ered issue. The need for key management starts
in the link layer. An applicable link layer stan-
dard in a WSN is IEEE 802.15.4. Although this
standard considers key usage for secure data
transmission, it does not specify how to
exchange keys securely. This leaves open the
key management problem that is the focus of
much recent research. Besides the link layer,
upper layers such as the network and applica-
tion layers also must exchange keys securely.
Many security-critical applications depend on
key management processes to operate but also
demand a high level of fault tolerance when a
node is compromised. This is a challenging
problem because there are many stringent
requirements for key management, and the
resources available to implement such processes
are highly constrained.
SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
KEY MANAGEMENT
Key management requirements can be divided
into security requirements that form a subset of
the overall WSN security requirements and
operational requirements that act as constraints
in the design and realization of key manage-
ment.
Table 1 [1] shows the comprehensive security
requirements of a WSN. For key management,
the most critical requirements are robustness and
self-organization. Although confidentiality and
integrity are important, the ability to distribute
secret, shared keys satisfies both requirements,
and all key management schemes are able to
accomplish this. Likewise, data freshness is typi-
cally attained by including a nonce (a crypto-
graphic time stamp) in each packet to verify that
the data is new. That approach hinges on the
integrity of each data packet to ensure the nonce
has not been modified, which easily can be
accomplished after a secret, shared key is estab-
lished. On the other hand, self-organization —
the ability to independently self-organize and
self-heal in the presence of dynamic changes in a
WSN — is a requirement that is more difficult
to satisfy. Normally, without the considerations
of security, WSNs are designed to satisfy this
property such that nodes can freely form con-
nections around a failed node or re-establish the
network automatically after it has been dis-
turbed. However, when a key management
scheme distributes certain communication keys
to a few nodes, this requirement can be violated
as other nodes are unable to form connections
dynamically with these specific nodes for lack of
proper keys.
With robustness, the problem lies with the
compromise of one or more nodes. Because
WSN nodes are frequently deployed in unsuper-
vised and remote locations, physical tampering is
a real threat, and the WSN must be able to with-
stand the compromise of some nodes. If the net-
work uses only one key, then the compromise of
one node compromises the entire network. If the
network uses multiple keys, it is interesting to
determine how many compromised nodes it
takes to compromise the security of the entire
network. We look at the distribution schemes
and discuss robustness in more detail later.
On the other hand, several operational
requirements exist for WSNs: accessibility, flexi-
bility, and scalability. These requirements act as
constraints for security design because one must
ensure that they are not violated in the design
and realization of a security scheme. Accessibili-
ty, the need for data to be accessible by many
nodes, arises as WSNs must efficiently utilize the
limited energy, computation, and memory
n Table 1. Security requirements for wireless sensor networks [1].
Requirement Description
Confidentiality Nodes should not reveal any data to unintended recipients.
Integrity Data should not be changed between transmissions due to the environment ormalicious activities.
Data freshness Old data should not be used as new (i.e., prevent replay attacks).
Authentication Data used in decision-making processes must originate from the correct source.
Robustness
When some nodes are compromised, the entire network should not also become
compromised. The quantitative value with which this requirement should be
satisfied depends on the application.
Self-organization Nodes should be independent and flexible enough to be self-organizing(autonomous) and self-healing (failure tolerant).
Availability The network should not fail frequently.
Time synchronization Collaborative node applications need time synchronization. Time synchronizationprotocols should not be manipulated to produce inaccurate time.
Secure localization Nodes should be able to accurately and securely acquire location information.
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resources. A popular scheme to enhance
resource efficiency is data aggregation or data
fusion, which combines data from other nodes
with local data before routing the fused data
towards the sink node. This process requires the
intermediate nodes to interpret the data being
sent by the other nodes. Likewise, at event detec-
tion points, neighbor nodes must be able to
overhear transmissions from other nodes to
ensure that only one node reports the event
instead of every possible node. Later, we discuss
how different schemes impact accessibility.
Another crucial operational requirement is flexi-
bility. For example, in a large WSN, nodes can
frequently join or leave the network due to net-
work expansion or battery depletion. A key man-
agement scheme must support this process with
easy addition or deletion of keys. This is chal-
lenging as the lack of a central key management
entity makes the addition and deletion of keys a
tedious, inefficient, and more importantly, an
insecure task. Lastly, the scalability of the key
management scheme is an important perfor-
mance factor. IEEE 802.15.4-compliant WSNs
can theoretically support up to 65,536 nodes.
Therefore, a key management scheme must be
scalable up to this maximum network size.
Although WSNs seldom exceed a few thousand
nodes in practice, even this number is very chal-
lenging for some key management schemes that
are less scalable. The previous discussion is sum-
marized in Table 2.
KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
The three simplest keying models that are used
to compare the different relationships between
the WSN security and operational requirements
are network keying, pairwise keying, and group
keying. A detailed problem and benefit analysis
is summarized in Table 3.
The network keying model has inherent
advantages over the other two schemes. It is
simple, easy to manage, and uses very little
resources. It also allows easy collaboration of
nodes since neighboring nodes can read and
interpret each other’s data, satisfying the self-
organization and accessibility requirements very
well. It is also excellent in terms of scalability
and flexibility because there is only one key for
the entire network, and it does not change with
the addition of nodes. However, an unaccept-
able drawback in robustness exists. Suppose
one node is compromised, and the network-
wide key is exposed. With this key, an adversary
can eavesdrop on all messages in the network
and even inject forged messages into the net-
work, possibly disrupting the proper operation
of the network.
At the other extreme, the pairwise keying
model employs N – 1 keys in each node, where
N is the size of the network. Although this
model provides the ultimate in robustness
against node capture because the compromise
of one node does not compromise any other
node, it fails to satisfy the scalability require-
ment because the storage cost grows rapidly
with network size. In the case of several thou-
sand nodes, the number of keys each node
must maintain becomes unmanageable. Consid-
er the storage of N – 1 keys per node. The
total number of distinguishable keys in the net-
work is N(N – 1)/2, which grows at a rate of
N2; this is not maintainable when N is a large
value. Another issue with the pairwise keying
model is that it is difficult to add new nodes to
the network, affecting the flexibility require-
ment. When a new node is added, every node
must obtain a new key to communicate with it.
This is a resource-intensive process that uses
much more precious energy when compared
with the simple preloading of a network-wide
key as in the previous model. Similarly, key
revocation and key refreshing suffer from the
same scalability problem. Additionally, the
accessibility requirement is in jeopardy as
nodes cannot passively monitor event signals.
Lastly, in the case of some pairwise key distri-
bution schemes, self-organization comes into
question, because they tackle the scalability
problem by reducing the number of shared
keys, resulting in some nodes being unable to
communicate with others and compromising
the self-healing and self-organizing abilities of
the network.
The group keying scheme combines the fea-
tures of both network and pairwise keying
schemes. Within a group of nodes that form a
cluster, communications are performed using a
single, shared key similar to network keying.
However, communications between groups
employ a different key between each pair of
groups in a manner identical to the pairwise
keying scheme. Thus, for a group of nodes, the
accessibility requirement is satisfied because
data aggregation can occur with no additional
cost while some degree of robustness is main-
tained. When one of the nodes is compromised,
the worst-case scenario is the compromise of
the entire cluster that it belongs to, which is
considerably more isolated than the entire net-
work. In terms of scalability, an acceptable
trade off is possible in this scheme, because the
number of keys increases with the number of
groups, not with the size of the network. How-
ever, the problem with this scheme is that it is
difficult to set up and also, the formation of the
groups is a very application dependent process.
To efficiently distribute the keys, a keying
scheme would require group formation infor-
mation. Furthermore, the existing IEEE
802.15.4 MAC specification has no support for
group keying with its current use of access con-
trol lists [2].
n Table 2. Operational requirements for wireless sensor networks [1].
Requirement Description
Accessibility
Intermediate nodes should be able to perform data aggre-
gation by combining data from different nodes. Neighbor-
ing nodes should also be able to passively monitor event
signals to prevent large amounts of redundant event signal-
ing information.
Flexibility Nodes should be replaceable when compromised. On-the-flyaddition of nodes should also be supported.
Scalability A WSN should concurrently support at least 3000 nodeseven with the key management scheme in place.
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PROMISING KEY MANAGEMENT
PROTOCOLS
To realize a practical, robust keying model,
researchers have proposed various key manage-
ment protocols that address the problems in
each of the three basic schemes discussed previ-
ously. In this section, five different key manage-
ment protocols are presented and reviewed in
chronological order.
ESCHENAUER AND GLIGOR
Eschenauer and Gligor [3] presented one of the
first key management schemes for WSNs that is
elegant, simple, and provides an effective trade
off between robustness and scalability. This
scheme works as follows:
• Generate a large pool of keys (e.g., 10,000
keys).
• Randomly take k keys out of the pool to estab-
lish a key ring, where k << N, where N is the
total number of nodes. Each node receives its
own unique key ring, consisting of a subset of
keys.
• When two nodes must communicate, they
search for a common key within the key ring
by broadcasting the identities (IDs) of the
keys they have. If such a key does not exist,
they attempt to communicate through a com-
mon third party, who is able to establish com-
munications with both nodes. This phase is
called path-key discovery.
As one can see, as long as the total number
of keys stored in a node is less than N – 1, the
scheme uses less storage than a pure pairwise
scheme. This scheme also is scalable because the
number of keys in the pool and the size of the
key ring are both adjustable. Therefore, a more
mission critical application can use a larger pool
of keys and adjust the key ring size appropriately
to be more secure. However, this scheme has
some drawbacks. Compared to the newer
schemes, Eschenauer’s random key distribution
is just a key distribution scheme. It lacks the
authentication process and does not clearly
define any process for revoking or refreshing
keys. In addition, the dynamic handshaking pro-
cess for each connection prevents any form of
passive data aggregation; thus, one event detect-
ed by two neighboring nodes will result in two
separate signals. There is no support for cluster-
ing or collaborative operations. If a home light-
ing automation application uses Eschenauer’s
keying scheme, turning off all the lights on one
floor would entail sending a message to each
light, which is rather inefficient. Lastly, since not
every node is guaranteed to have a common key
with all of its neighbors, there is a chance that
some nodes will be unreachable [3]. Overall,
Eschenauer’s scheme failed to satisfy security
requirement authentication and operational
requirement accessibility.
DU, DENG, HAN, AND VARSHNEY
In 2003, Du et al. proposed a key management
scheme [4] based on the pairwise keying model.
This model extends Eschenauer and Blom’s
work [5] by using the same paradigm as
Eschenauer and Gligor [3] but instead of indi-
vidual keys, it uses the concept of Blom’s key
matrix, which is an array of keys. In Du’s scheme,
there are k key matrices in each node, and the
key matrices are distributed randomly.
Blom’s model is based on the idea of a sym-
metric matrix multiplication, where row i column
j is equivalent to row j column i. Thus, when
node i calculates key ij and node j calculates key
ji, the keys are identical, leading to a commonly
shared secret. Blom’s scheme distributes the
information required for this calculation in
terms of a public matrix and a private matrix.
In Du’s pairwise key management scheme,
instead of using only one private matrix, the sink
node generates i private matrices, and each node
stores a subset of these matrices in the same
manner as Eschenauer’s key ring. When two
n Table 3. Common key distribution schemes for WSNs.
Model Description Benefits Problems
Network The entire network usesone shared secret key.
• Simple
• Allows data aggregation and fusion
• Scalable
• Able to self-organize
• Flexible/accessible
• Compromise of one node compromises the entire
network (lacks robustness)
Pairwise
Each specific pair of
nodes shares a different
key.
• Best robustness
• Authenticates each node
• Nonscalable — storage, energy, computation
• Unable to self-organize
• Not flexible for addition/removal of nodes
Group Each group uses adifferent shared key.
• Allows multicast
• Allows group collaboration
• Better robustness than network-wide
keying
• Adjustable scalability
• Addition/removal of nodes possible
• Able to self-organize within the
cluster
• Lacks efficient storage method for group keying in
IEEE 802.15.4
• Difficult to set up securely
• Cluster formation information is application-
dependent
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nodes must communicate, they start by broad-
casting the node IDs, the indices of key matrices
they carry, and the seed of the column of the
public matrix. If they share a common key
matrix, then they can compute the pairwise
secret key using Blom’s scheme. If they do not
share a common key matrix, they will go into a
path-key discovery phase to find a common third
party to route the data.
The benefit of Du’s scheme is that it offers
an even stronger robustness against node com-
promise at a reasonable scalability cost. The
authors claimed that an adversary must compro-
mise five times as many nodes compared with
Eschenauer’s scheme to compromise the entire
network. Their analysis of scalability shows that
the energy cost remains reasonable and on par
with the energy cost of using the advanced
encryption standard for a WSN consisting of 264
nodes, which is 48 times higher than the maxi-
mum number of nodes defined in IEEE 802.15.4.
The main disadvantage of this scheme is its com-
plexity, which makes it hard to implement and
increases overhead costs. Also, cluster opera-
tions are not supported because it is a pairwise
keying scheme, and neither key revocation nor
key refreshing are considered. The operational
requirement, accessibility, is also difficult to sat-
isfy because nodes will not be able to passively
monitor communications. Lastly, compared to
other, simpler schemes, Du’s scheme likely uses
more energy due to its computational complexity
and on-demand key computation. To summarize,
Du’s scheme can satisfy most requirements but
in the operational requirements area, it fails to
satisfy accessibility and may not be competitive
with simpler schemes in terms of scalability due
to its higher overhead costs.
LEAP — ZHU, SETIA, AND JAJORDIA
Zhu, Setia, and Jajordia introduced the localized
encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP)
[6], which employs a hybrid approach. This is a
jack-of-all-trades protocol offering network-wide,
cluster/group, and pairwise keying capabilities.
To accomplish this, LEAP uses four types of
keys: individual, group, cluster, and pairwise
shared keys. The individual key is unique for each
sensor node to communicate with the sink node.
The group key is a network-wide key for commu-
nication from the sink node to all sensor nodes.
An authentication mechanism known as µTimed
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication
Protocol (µTESLA) [7] is used for the broadcast
authentication of the sink node, which ensures
that packets sent with the group key are from
the sink node only. The cluster key is used for
collaborations within a cluster. An authentica-
tion mechanism known as a one-way hash-key
chain that employs a non-reversible mathemati-
cal operation is used to ensure that the source of
the packet can be authenticated without preclud-
ing passive data aggregation. Lastly, the pairwise
shared key is used for secure communications
between neighboring nodes.
LEAP uses a pre-distribution key to help
establish the four types of keys. The individual
key is first established using a function of a seed
and the ID of the node. Then, in the pairwise
shared key phase, a neighbor discovery process
is initiated, and nodes broadcast their IDs. The
receiving node uses a function, seeded with an
initial key, to calculate the shared key between it
and all of its neighbors. Afterwards, the initial
key and any intermediate keys that were gener-
ated are erased. Thirdly, the cluster key is dis-
tributed by the cluster head using pairwise
communication secured with the pairwise shared
key. Lastly, for distributing the network-wide
group key, the sink node broadcasts it in a multi-
hop, cluster-by-cluster manner starting with the
closest cluster.
LEAP has many advantages that satisfy the
requirements of WSNs. First, it has µTESLA
and one-way key chain authentication, as well as
key revocation and key refreshing. The accessi-
bility requirement also can be easily satisfied by
encrypting data that requires aggregation with
the cluster key. The fine granularity it supports
enables data to be encrypted at the correct level
(i.e., key level) to ensure reasonable security is
achieved without prohibiting data fusion or
aggregation. The scalability of LEAP can be
analyzed in terms of computational cost and
storage cost. The computational cost of LEAP is
inversely proportional to the number of nodes
and directly proportional to the number of
neighbors (i.e., node density) [6] because the
higher the density of the network, the more con-
nections are formed per cluster. The storage cost
also is quite reasonable as pairwise keying is
used only for one-hop neighbors. It is apparent
that LEAP satisfies both the security and opera-
tional requirements very well. The only draw-
back with LEAP is that it assumes the sink node
is never compromised.
SHELL — YOUNIS, GHUMMAN, AND ELTOWEISSY
The Scalable, Hierarchical, Efficient, Location-
aware, and Light-weight (SHELL) protocol [8] is
a complicated cluster-based key management
scheme published recently. It is influenced by
LEAP with its use of multiple types of keys but
introduces a new distributed key management
entity. Each cluster has its own distributed key
management entity residing in a non-cluster-
head node. Thus, the operational responsibility
and key management responsibility are separat-
ed, leading to a better resiliency against node
capture. Because there are multiple different
entities and over seven types of keys, the key set
up and communication processes are too com-
plex to be described in detail in this article.
Interested readers are referred to [8].
The main benefit of SHELL is that it has a
high robustness against node capture. Although
some nodes have unique functions, the capture
of that particular node does not reveal enough
keys to compromise the entire network nor to
disrupt the operation of the network. For
instance, the capture of a key-generating gate-
way node, a key management entity, does not
compromise the network because it does not
contain the key between the cluster head and
the cluster nodes. Likewise, due to the distribut-
ed feature, there are at least two key-generating
gateway nodes and the disruption of one does
not hinder the operation of the network. In
addition, SHELL accounts for the processes for
node addition, replacement, and refreshment of
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keys. It also supports cluster (group) communi-
cations and does not preclude data fusion or
aggregation within the clusters. However,
SHELL has some drawbacks. Its structure and
operation are highly complex, involving hetero-
geneous node operations and multiple (at least
seven) types of keys. The specific network enti-
ties include the gateway node, key-generating
gateway node, inter-gateway node, command
node, and sensor node. The energy consumption
and cryptographic overheads, although scalable,
have not been compared with other schemes.
Due to its increased complexity, the energy
usage and cryptographic overhead are likely
higher than other schemes. Finally, the imple-
mentation of such a complex protocol also may
be difficult with the current programming limita-
tions of a WSN. To conclude, SHELL focuses
on satisfying the robustness and security require-
ments while trading off the availability require-
ment since higher complexity leads to higher
energy usage and lowers the mean time between
failures. In this case, failures would likely occur
due to the depletion of battery energy of individ-
ual nodes.
PANJA, MADRIA, AND BHARGAVA
Panja et al. [9] recently introduced a hierarchical
group keying scheme using the Tree-based
Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol. The
main feature of this scheme is that each key is
made up of many partial keys. By breaking up
the keys into smaller components, it makes
rekeying an efficient and simple task by revok-
ing, changing, or adding one or more partial
key(s).
The TGDH keying scheme works on a hierar-
chical WSN that has one level of general sensor
nodes and multiple levels of cluster heads; that
is, there can be a head of clusters responsible for
multiple cluster heads below it in a tree-like
manner. The data collection process starts with a
group of sensor nodes collecting data from a
region of interest and sending it to the nearest
cluster head. The cluster head then aggregates
the data to reduce the size and overhead and
sends it to its parent. The parent, if it has multi-
ple children, repeats the process of data aggre-
gation and forwards the data to its parent until
the sink node is reached.
To establish the keys in this hierarchical tree-
based WSN, two separate schemes are used:
intra-cluster and inter-cluster keying. The intra-
cluster keying process starts with the leaf nodes
sending each of their partial keys to the parent.
Then the parent calculates its own partial key
and combines the partial keys together to form
the cluster key. The parent node then broadcasts
this cluster key to its leaf nodes. All communica-
tions are encrypted with a pre-distributed key to
provide confidentiality during this early stage.
Afterwards, the inter-cluster keying is initiated.
This process is very similar to that of intra-clus-
ter keying except that intermediate keys of the
parents (children of the next higher level) are
used instead of the partial keys.
The advantage of this scheme is that com-
pared to SHELL, it is simple and elegant and
hence, easy to implement. Panja et al. also simu-
lated the performance of their scheme in com-
parison with Security Protocols for Sensor
Networks (SPINS) [7], a keying protocol that
establishes secure one-to-one communication in
a WSN. The results are promising with fast and
scalable key delivery time and energy usage.
Also, by using small partial keys, the storage and
computational costs are reduced. This is espe-
cially significant for the leaf nodes that frequent-
ly have the least amount of resources at their
disposal. The drawback of Panja’s scheme is that
although key revocation and key refreshing pro-
cesses are addressed, node addition and replace-
ment are not considered explicitly. In addition,
its security robustness against the compromise of
the initial pre-distributed key has not been ana-
lyzed. Further, the security strength of the low
complexity keys at the leaf nodes, for example,
against brute-force attacks, has not been proven.
To conclude, Panja’s scheme trades off robust-
ness to better satisfy the self-organization, acces-
sibility, flexibility, and scalability requirements.
The use of a tree-based hierarchical structure
also ensures that this protocol is very scalable.
SUMMARY
The promising key management protocols sur-
veyed in this article are summarized in Table 4.
Table 5 and Table 6, respectively, compare the
performance, advantages, and disadvantages of
these protocols.
n Table 4. Summary of key management schemes.
Scheme Date Structure Key generation Description
Eschenauer 2002 Partial pairwise, randomkey distribution Static
Randomly selects k keys out of a large pool to form a key ring.
Common keys in a pair of node’s key ring allow communication.
Du 2003 Pairwise, matrix Dynamic Selects T key matrices and uses matrix multiplication to com-pute pairwise shared key dynamically.
LEAP 2003 Hybrid: network, group,neighbor pairwise Mostly static Uses a predistributed key to establish four types of keys.
SHELL 2006 Group, distributed keymanagement roles Dynamic
Uses a distributed key management entity to generate and
manage keys.
Panja 2006 Group, hierarchical network Dynamic Uses multiple partial keys to compute group keys dynamically.
LEE LAYOUT  10/3/07  2:32 PM  Page 81
                         
Authorized licensed use limited to: Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Downloaded on March 15, 2009 at 23:49 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
IEEE Wireless Communications • October 200782
TRENDS IN KEY MANAGEMENT
Although there are many papers published on
various keying schemes, whether or not they
will  be implemented or used in practice
depends on market demands. A proposed
scheme likely will be adopted in practice if it
targets open standards. Recently, both the
IEEE 802.15 task group and the ZigBee
Alliance have released newly revised standards.
Despite the fact that the new IEEE 802.15.4b
still does not specify a key management scheme,
it clarifies ambiguities and enhances many fea-
tures compared with the original standard. In
this section, we discuss the security related
changes in 802.15.4b and the features relevant
to key management in the newly enhanced Zig-
Bee standard 2006.
The 802.15 task group 4b was chartered to
provide specific enhancements and clarifications
to the original 802.15.4-2003 standard. The
revised standard was published in September
2006 as 802.15.4-2006. In terms of the security
changes, the standard introduces a new counter
with cipher block chaining mode* (CCM*)
cipher suite mode, which incorporates the confi-
dentiality-only and authentication-only modes
that were provided, non-securely, by cipher
block chaining (CBC) and counTeR (CTR)
cipher suite modes in the original standard.
Another new feature of the 4b standard that is
relevant to key management is secure group
keying. Many applications can benefit from
secure broadcasting or multicasting abilities.
Unfortunately, the secure broadcasting mecha-
nism in 802.15.4-2003 is actually insecure
because it does not provide data freshness and
is vulnerable to replay attacks. The replay attack
vulnerability can be exploited against applica-
tions that require secure broadcast, such as
home automation. Imagine the devastating
effect of a replayed lights-off broadcast right
before a home invasion. Hence, replay resistant
broadcasting has been introduced in 4b using
frame counters on a per-device basis, and the
feature is made more flexible with the introduc-
tion of group keying. Many other small clarifica-
tions were proposed, but only the most relevant
ones were presented here.
The ZigBee Enhanced standard was released
in September 2006 and offers improvements and
new features. The most relevant feature is the
support of group devices and targeted broad-
casts. Like 802.15.4b, the ZigBee Alliance also
has treated group device support with a high pri-
ority. In addition, the new targeted broadcast
feature that can reach a specific subset of devices
(routers, end nodes, sleeping nodes, currently
awake nodes) is important to key management
scheme selection because it adds a new function-
al requirement. It is worthwhile to take these
new features into account when considering the
various key management schemes.
Based on the new trends in 802.15.4b and the
ZigBee Enhanced standard, one can easily
assume that a purely random or pairwise keying
scheme like Eschenauer [3] and Du [4] would
not be commercially viable. The keying schemes
that offer group or multicast abilities are much
more compatible with industry trends. Thus, the
development of a key management scheme that
incorporates the flexible network, pair, and clus-
ter abilities found in LEAP, along with the
adjustable robustness of Eschenauer or Du may
be desirable. The main issue with SHELL is its
high complexity; further developments can target
streamlining of its processes and reduction of
overheads. Panja’s scheme also has some advan-
tages for extremely large networks, and one
might want to enhance Panja’s scheme with the
multiple-level keying of LEAP, for added flexi-
bility, or with Eschenauer’s or Du’s scheme, for
increased robustness. In any case, the trade offs
presented earlier remain true, and the two new
industry standards provide a good guideline to
the acceptable essential services that a viable key
management solution must provide.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we reviewed five key management
schemes starting with the classic Eschenauer
scheme and moving to the more recent schemes
published in 2006. It is clear that numerous
trade offs exist between different key manage-
ment schemes, and the vast number of proposals
make it difficult to compare them. Recent trends
also show that cluster or group operation is a
required feature that has been considered by
many recent key management proposals includ-
ing LEAP, SHELL, and Panja’s scheme. Each
one of these schemes has its own strengths, such
as the LEAP adjustable security level, the strong
robustness of SHELL, and Panja’s hierarchical
scalability. One must consider the trade offs
carefully when selecting key management
schemes. For instance, although SHELL offers a
high robustness, it is also far more complex than
the other two and thus, may be difficult to imple-
ment. LEAP, on the other hand, has the flexibil-
ity to switch between group, network, and
pairwise keying on a per packet basis, but the
protocol must be studied further for security
weaknesses. Future developments could incorpo-
rate the flexibility of LEAP with the adjustable
robustness offered by Eschenauer or Du’s
scheme. For security-critical applications,
SHELL seems to offer the highest robustness,
but it may be further improved to reduce imple-
n Table 5. Relative performance of key management schemes [10].
Scheme Simplicity Scalability Robustness Storage efficiency1
Eschenauer H M L M/H
Du L L H L/M
LEAP M M M M
SHELL L M H L/M
Panja M H M M/H
Legends: H = High, M = Mid, L = Low. For each variable, the higher the
value, the better performance it has.
1 Storage cost may change with different factors. We can only estimate the
relative cost based on available information.
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mentation complexity. For extremely large
WSNs, improving Panja’s scheme to take advan-
tage of its highly scalable hierarchical feature
may prove attractive.
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n Table 6. Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of key management schemes.
Scheme Advantage Disadvantage
Eschenauer
• Uses less storage than a pure pairwise scheme
• Adjustable robustness trade-off with storage cost
• Simple and implementable
• No authentication available
• No support for cluster operations
• Some nodes may not be reachable
• Low accessibility
Du
• Provides node authentication in an Eschenauer-like
scheme
• Energy cost remains reasonable
• Excellent robustness
• High complexity
• No support for cluster operations
• High relative energy cost
• Low accessibility
LEAP
• Supports cluster, pairwise, and network-wide operations
(good for data fusion/aggregation)
• Can detect and isolate compromised nodes quickly using
µTELSA and one-way key chain hashing authentication
• Reasonable complexity and scalability
• Security during the startup key establishment process
may be weak
• Storage cost is high for a small number of nodes due to
the use of four types of keys
• Assumes the sink node is never compromised
SHELL
• Supports addition and replacement of nodes
• Refreshes keys using only a few messages
• Utilizes distributed key management entity
• High robustness
• High accessibility
• Complex operations with highly heterogeneous node
operations
• Storage cost is high for a low number of nodes due to
the use of seven or more types of keys
• Higher cryptographic overhead
• Overall energy cost is higher due to complex operations
Panja
• Simple and elegant
• Fast and easy key refreshing process
• Highly scalable using TGDH scheme
• Low storage cost for leaf nodes
• Ideal for shorter-term sensor networks
• Nonadjustable security strength
• Does not clearly address key revocation or node addition
• Long-term eavesdropping may present a threat if initial
key is compromised
• Leaf node security using small partial keys may not be
strong enough against analysis by widely available high
computational platforms
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